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MORALITY
IN LEGAL PRACTICE
REV. WILLIAM F. CAHILL*
O NE CANNOT SPEAK of a moral way of practicing law without
stating, at least summarily, his philosophy of law and relating
it to his philosophy of morals. Two concepts are characteristic of
and basic in natural law jurisprudence: that the legal order is part of
the moral order, and that the moral order is subject to modification by
the legal order. The same concepts may be expressed in other terms:
an unjust law is no law, and a just law creates, alters and discharges
moral obligations.
Jurisprudence and Justice
Jurisprudence is a science which serves the virtue of justice. Juris-
prudence discovers what is just in human law, and justice impels men
to enact, to execute, and to obey laws which are just. The impulse of
the virtue of justice is upon man's will-the virtue of justice is the habit
of choosing those acts and forbearances which, as reason shows, are
means appropriate to realize concretely the abstract principle of justice,
that each shall have what belongs to him. Man's duty to realize in his
conduct the virtue of justice and his duty to choose conduct appropriate
to that end's achievement are moral obligations.
Expediency Imposes No Obligations
Man's only true obligations are those of morality. The precepts of ex-
pediency, which advise a man what means are effective to achieve an
end or purpose he has chosen or may choose, do not create obligations.
These precepts do not bind a man's will to choose the end, and they do
not, therefore, oblige him to choose the means which, as reason indi-
cates, are effective to achieve the end. "If you want to please X, tell him
all you know about Y," may be an accurate statement of the means
*Former Editor, THE CATHOLIc LAWYER; B.A., Manhattan College (1932);
LL.B., St. John's University School of Law (1957); J.C.D., Lateran University
Pontifical Institute of Canon and Civil Law (1952).
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effective of the end of pleasing X-it may
well be that X would like nothing better
than to know what you know about Y.
But this precept of expediency imposes no
obligation. As an accurate statement of
how you can please X, it does not assert
or imply that you should please X, nor,
consequently, that you should tell X about
Y. Expediency can, of course, relate
pleasing X to a more ulterior end, such as
getting a job which is the gift of X. But
expediency's precept will be still contin-
gent: "If you want this job, please X, and
to please him, tell him about Y."
Obligation Postulates an Absolute
Obligation arises, and morality is in-
volved, when a man must choose an act or
a forbearance. An absolute enters into the
precept, so that it can be said "You must
get the job," or "You must please X," or
"You must tell him about Y." Suppose
that precepts of expediency establish that
getting this job is the only means by which
you can live-you are in a totalitarian
society in which useless persons are liqui-
dated, and you can be useful in no other
job than this one. Whether the mainte-
nance of life is an absolute which will
oblige you to get this job, and thus oblige
you to please X, and therefore oblige you
to tell him about Y, depends on what
you are.
If the entire significance of man's being
can be exhausted in a description of the
physical conditions upon which his life
depends and of the physical capacities
which his life imports, then life is not, for
him, an absolute. He has no obligation to
choose life and no obligation to choose
death-there is nothing in the world which
the sciences of chemistry, biology, physics
and psychology describe which can say to
him, "You must choose to live" or "You
must choose to die." These sciences can
say what will kill him or keep him alive,
and they can describe the physical, emo-
tional and mental processes which will or
may accompany or follow upon his act of
choosing to live or to die, but they cannot
offer an absolute which will make either
choice an imperative obligation.
Further, the physical world cannot, with-
out destroying man or his consciousness,
control his act of making a choice between
life and death. Physical force can intervene
to destroy the functioning of his nerves, so
that his will's decision cannot be imple-
mented even within his own body, or physi-
cal force can inhibit his bodily capacities
or their function, so that his will's decision
cannot be implemented exteriorly. Force
can frustrate the will, and it can influence
the will indirectly, by threat of conse-
quences to follow on one choice or other,
but force cannot directly control the will.
The Absolute in Human Conduct
The will of man can be directly con-
trolled only by its proper object. It is the
nature of the will to choose the good, as it
is the nature of the mind to know the
true. As nature impels the mind to inquire
after the true and to seize upon it in the act
of knowledge, nature impels the will to
desire the good and to seize upon it in the
act of choice. By nature, there is only one
object which can control the will perfectly
-one object which the will cannot but
choose. That object is the absolute and
perfect good.
Every concrete object of the will's choice
is presented to the will by the mind, and in
presenting each object, the mind shows it
to be good in some degree. If the mind
could present perfectly to the will an object
absolutely good, the will could not but
choose that object. In this life, however,
the mind cannot present to the will even
the absolute good with such perfect clarity
that the will cannot reject the absolute
good. In the absence of a perfect mental
presentation of the absolute good, the will's
choice of a good object is not inevitable.
Yet the natural response or inclination of
the will is to choose, among several objects
presented to its election, that which the
mind shows to be the greater good. Thus,
the mind's evaluation of the greater or less
goodness of the objects it presents to the
will is the only natural guide which can
directly and intimately influence the will's
act of choosing.
The mind's evaluation of the goodness
of an object has two premises: that, in the
order of being, there is an absolute good,
in reference to which all other real things
are good; and that, in the order of knowl-
edge, the mind can discover, albeit im-
perfectly, the real absolute good and its
relations. If, in the order of being, man's
power of choice has no ultimate object, or
if, in the order of knowledge, man can
know no absolute good whose embrace-
ment by willful choice is the raison d'6tre
of man's power to choose, then there is no
moral order controlling man's choice, for
it cannot be said that man should or must
choose any particular good rather than any
other.
But if, in the order of being, man is the
creature of an intelligent God, and if man's
mind, 'by employing the concepts of cause
and effect, can discover that fact, then
there is a real order. That order, examined
by man through the concepts of end and
means, directs man's acts of choice to an
ultimate and absolute good. The act by
which an intelligent God creates is an in-
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telligent act and, as such, must have pur-
pose. The ultimate purpose of the Supreme
Being can be only Itself. If that Being
creates man with a will capable of choosing
good and the Creator Himself is supremely
good, then the ultimate purpose of this
creative act, and the purpose binding abso-
lutely upon the will created, must be that
the created power of choice shall choose,
that is, shall love, its Creator.
Thus, the will of man, in its creation, is
bound by the obligation to choose God as
against any other thing which may be pre-
sented to it as an alternative object of
choice. This is the root principle of all
man's obligations. The ultimate end of
man's choosing, as of man's being, is God
-that end is the absolute which imposes
upon man the obligation to choose with his
will no object whose choice turns man, in
any degree, from his ultimate end.
Reason Discovers the Order of
Being and the Order of Morals
The detailed design for human conduct
which leads man to God as his ultimate
natural end is the natural moral order-it
is an aspect of the natural order of being
which is the detailed design of God's cre-
ative act. From time to time in human
history, God has communicated to men, by
the supernatural act called revelation, some
of the principles which describe the order
of being and the moral order established
by the divine act of creation. Yet the prin-
ciples of the order of being and the moral
order set up in the act of creation are open
to discovery by human reason.
These natural orders do not preclude
God's establishing, by acts distinct from
the act of creation, supernatural orders of
being and of morality. God has in fact,
without altering essentially man's created
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nature, destined man to share in the divine
life of God Himself. That destiny gives to
man grace-a new principle of activity,
distinct from his natural life. This super-
natural vital principle puts man in a new
order of being-the order of divine son-
ship-which is distinct from the order of
created nature. That man is established in
this new order of being implies that there
is for his conduct a new moral order.
These supernatural orders, of being and of
morals, differ from, but do not destroy or
essentially alter the natural orders of being
and morality. The principles of the super-
natural orders cannot be discovered by
natural human reason unaided-they can
be known by reason when reason is helped
by the supernatural aid called faith.
The Principles of the
Natural Order of Being
The mind of man applies -to the phe-
nomena of the physical world the intuitive
rational principles of causality and suffi-
cient reason, to discover the principles of
the natural order of being. Some of the
principles clearly validated by this intel-
lectual inquiry are these: that the world
is the product of the creative act of the
one, supreme, infinite, intelligent and free
God; that the ultimate end of man's exis-
tence is God-that the union with God to
which man is naturally destined is a union
of understanding and of free will, choice
or love.
The order of being and its principles
concern facts and factual relations, sus-
ceptible to discovery by the process of
"speculative reason" which has for its
basic tools the concepts of cause and ef-
fect, and for its purpose the discovery of
what is true. The relations discovered and
described are chiefly necessary ones, which
cannot be other than they are in fact. The
conclusions of speculative reason as to the
principles of the order of being are, there-
fore, endowed with a high degree of cer-
tainty.
The Principles of the
Natural Moral Order
The nature of man, as described by the
principles of the order of being, is exam-
ined under the concepts of end and means,
in order to discover the principles of the
moral order by which man's conduct is
guided. Man's nature, as the subject of this
examination, is man's entire and integral
nature - the inclinations of nature are
guides to moral principles of conduct only
in so far as they are the inclinations of
reason or the inclinations of other parts of
human nature ruled by reason.
The purpose of this process is to dis-
cover what is good, that is, to perceive the
order which relates the objects which man's
will may embrace as good, among them-
selves and to the absolute good. This last
is the ultimate object of man's willful
choice, it is God, to Whom man unites
himself by understanding choice-by the
act called love. Some of the basic prin-
ciples of the moral order are: good-
whatever contributes to the union of man's
will with God's will-must be done, and
evil must be avoided; human life, as a
moral value, is superior to any value in-
volving property only; and an evil means,
employed to accomplish a good end, is
nonetheless evil. The moral evaluation of
many particular ends, such as the destruc-
tion or preservation of human life and
liberty, as good or evil, can be made with
a high degree of certainty, since the rea-
soning process there involved is chiefly
deductive. The particular end is viewed
with reference to man's ultimate end of
union with God, and the causal relation
between the ultimate and the particular is
adequately perceived. But the evaluation
of many other particular ends, and the
evaluation of means for achieving many
particular ends in the concrete, involve
causal relations too unclear to warrant a
conclusion by deduction. Evaluation can
be made inductively-this type of conduct
has good moral results in this case and in
that case, and in the other case-or it has
evil moral results in so many other cases.
Many of the conclusions available to rea-
son in these matters are, therefore, prod-
ucts of incomplete induction, which can-
not yield perfect certainty. Yet if the con-
clusions are so highly probable as to
exclude reasonable doubt, they are said
to be morally certain-in matters of hu-
man conduct it is often practically im-
possible to achieve perfect certainty, and
human action would be paralyzed if it had
to wait upon that achievement. Conclu-
sions which are less probable, having only
"the greater weight of probability," and
even those having lesser weight yet being
"supported by solid reason," have sig-
nificance as guides to human conduct in
circumstances where the obligation to act
with care or to act only after inquiry is
relatively lighter.
Reason's search for the true principles
of the natural moral order is sometimes
aided by revelation. God, speaking in a
supernatural way, through the Scriptural
writers He inspired and through the in-
fallible teaching of His Church, has in-
dicated clearly some natural moral prin-
ciples whose discovery is difficult and even
uncertain when they are sought only in the
indications of nature. Revelation helps
reason in these matters, not only directly,
by stating the true principles explicitly, but
even indirectly, by calling to the mind's
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attention some aspects of nature whose
moral significance, on first view, was not
clear. Thus the conclusions of moralists in
respect of duties bearing upon the life of
the unborn have been clarified and even
revised in the light of Church doctrine
which implies that the human rational soul
is infused in the first instant of conception.
The Legal Order is Part of
the Moral Order
The legal order is one sector of the
natural moral order. God, in creating man,
has ordained that to accomplish the per-
fection of his nature man shall live in com-
munity with other men. To direct the
conduct of men to the purposes which the
community, by divine ordination, serves,
the community is given a share in God's
power to bind the will of man-to impose
upon men true moral obligations.
The Legal Order Distinguished
Within the Moral Order
Any man can be said to bind the con-
science of any other man when he brings
to the attention of the other a precept of
the moral order which is applicable to
conduct that the other contemplates. Like
the moral counsellor, the lawmaker urges
his subjects to obey the precepts, such as
that against theft, which are conclusively,
that is, deductively, imposed by the prin-
ciples of the moral order. But, unlike the
counsellor, the lawmaker can morally bind
his subjects also by precepts which impose
categorically ends and means which the
natural law imposes only alternatively.
If I have wilfully broken through my
neighbor's fence, the natural law obliges
me to repair the harm done and to prevent
further harm. In a given situation-I being
a competent workman and having at hand
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the appropriate materials-a moral coun-
sellor might advise me that the best means
of fulfilling my moral obligations would be
to repair the fence immediately, though he
would have to say that I would do no
wrong if I chose rather to warn my neighbor
of what had happened and to stand ready
to make money compensation for his harm.
The law, having to adapt itself to the com-
mon rather than the special situation, may
prescribe money payment and allow me no
credit for repairs, even when competently
made, unless they had been accepted by
the owner of the fence. If that is the law,
my neighbor may morally stand upon it,
and if he does so, I am morally bound to
obey it.
But it is the coercive moral power of the
lawmaker which essentially distinguishes
him from the moral counsellor. While the
counsellor can employ only reasoned in-
struction and persuasion to bring his client
to voluntarily fulfill the moral precept, the
lawmaker's distinctive power is to bind his
subject morally to a coerced, involuntary,
obedience. As was said when force was
discussed, the human will's choice cannot
be internally coerced. The law's external
coercion differs from brute force in this,
that the law's coercion, though it involves,
directly or indirectly, an exercise of physi-
cal force, is legitimated in the moral order
by the divine mandate to society. That
mandate morally obliges the members of a
society to accept the force which society
reasonably exercises to coerce obedience
of just laws.
It is this attribute of "coercibility"-
the legal precept's quality of being able to
achieve its objective where the subject's
will does not embrace the law's objective,
and even where the subject's will positively
rejects the law's objective-which distin-
guishes the law from all other precepts in
the moral order. It is this coercive quality
of the precepts of the legal order which
sets apart from the moral order in general
that special area thereof which we call the
legal or juridical order. The objective of
the moral precept against murder-the
moral perfection achieved by one who will-
ingly obeys the precept-is not achieved
where a man, fully wishing to kill his
neighbor, forbears to do so for fear of
punishment. But the objectives of the legal
precept-the immunity of any individual
from unjust death and that external peace
which all the neighbors need to accomplish
their moral self-perfection-are achieved in
such a case.
The lawmaker does not and need not use
his moral power to the full limits of its
potential, in every case.
When he prescribes conduct required by
natural moral precepts, the lawmaker adds
nothing to the moral obligation to act or
forbear in the subject matter, but he at-
taches a coercion to conduct violative of
the precept. The specific moral obligation
thus created-that the subject shall accept
the just coercion of the law-is the law-
maker's only contribution to the moral
situation.
When the lawmaker prescribes a line of
conduct not conclusively imposed by nat-
ural law, he always contributes this moral
obligation to accept just coercion. He may,
and usually does, impose also a moral
obligation as to the specific line of conduct
he directs-it is immoral to drive to the
left on Broadway, and to drive to the right
in Piccadilly Circus. But the lawmaker
need not impose a moral obligation as to
the specific line of conduct he directs-he
may choose to oblige his subject "only to
the penalty of the law." The intent thus to
limit the exercise of the law's moral poten-
tial seems quite clear in the matter of one
or two-hour parking limitations. The con-
duct forbidden is not naturally harmful or
dangerous, nor are the rights of property
or other rights of commutative justice in-
volved, nor is the common good seriously
affected. Thus, the sense of seriously con-
scientious men appears to support the view
that the only moral obligation of the over-
time parker is to obey the summons law-
fully issued and to pay the fine which the
court imposes.
But if the lawmaker intends that his
precept shall have no moral obligation
whatever, he abdicates his character of
lawmaker, and becomes either a mere
counsellor or a tyrant. If he urges a line of
conduct without being prepared to coerce
it in any way, he is a counsellor merely.
If he prescribes conduct not mandated by
natural law, with intent that his command
shall not morally oblige his subjects, but
imposing a coercion which reasoned mor-
ality does not oblige the subject to accept,
he is a complete tyrant. In either case, the
enactment is not law.
The lawmaker differs also from the par-
ent, but in a different respect. The parent,
like the state, can coerce unwilling obe-
dience, ,because the parent has responsi-
bility for the child's external welfare, as
the state has such responsibility in respect
of its citizens. But the parent is also en-
trusted by nature with the internal perfec-
tion of his child. Therefore, the parent's
command can bind his child morally even
in matters in which obedience cannot be
coerced. Thus the parent shares God's
power, not shared by the state, to bind the
conscience directly, without coercion.
It is a principle of the natural moral
order that every human law, if it be just,
11 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1965
binds the subject's conscience, to observe
the law or at least to accept its coercion.
It is not necessary that the lawmaker actu-
ally advert to the fact that his law imposes
an obligation of conscience, nor that he
believe in or understand the moral order
which makes his law effective in the realm
of conscience. If he is exercising power
legitimated to him by the natural law,
every just law, by which he intends to bind
his subjects in any way, binds them in con-
science.
The Test of the Human Enactment
as Just Law
The divine mandate, embodied in hu-
man nature, which empowers the commu-
nity to regulate its subjects' conduct by
imposing upon them moral obligations and
morally effective sanctions, is the ultimate
criterion by which human law is morally
evaluated. A social enactment which goes
beyond that mandate is not a just law-
indeed, it is not a law in any real sense
-it is only the shadow or shell or sem-
blance of a law. Examined by reason, the
divine mandate is seen to imply four prin-
ciples upon which a social enactment can
be evaluated as a just law, effective in the
moral and juridical order.
First Principle: A human law is not just
if it is contrary to higher law, that is, to
the natural law or the divine positive law
The natural moral order and the natural
law are products of God's intelligent and
wilful act of creation. It is inconceivable
that the supernatural order, which the
same Divine Wisdom has established for
men, should essentially conflict with the
natural moral law. Nor is it conceivable
that the law-making power of the human
community, if reasonably exercised and so
morally effective, should forbid or require
conduct which the supernatural order re-
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quires or forbids. Human law, therefore,
cannot impose or discharge moral obliga-
tions in derogation of the divine positive
law. Thus, a human law which purported
to forbid the use of wine for the Sacrament
of the Eucharist would be manifestly un-
just and morally ineffective.
Since it is the natural moral order which
validates the power of the human com-
munity to make true law, the exercise of
that power cannot rise above its source, as
it would do if it could competently make
law contrary to a rule of conduct which
follows as a necessary conclusion from the
principles of natural law. Thus a law which
directs mutilation not required for the sub-
ject's own health nor reasonably imposed
as punishment for wrongdoing is unjust.
A human law is unjust, not only when
its command runs counter to a principle
of the higher law, but also when it fails to
enact rules of conduct which are necessary
conclusions from the higher law, as if, for
example, a legal system would in no way
forbid murder, or would permit self de-
fense in no circumstances.
The rules of human conduct which are
necessary conclusions from natural law
and divine positive law are relatively few
in number, as compared with the total
number of the moral law's precepts and
prohibitions. Most concrete moral rules of
human conduct are premised upon the
judgment that the conduct in question
tends toward fulfillment or toward frustra-
tion of the principles of natural law. These
principles require, among other things,
that man in society contribute to the com-
mon good-this requirement will be dis-
cussed in detail under the Third Principle
and thereafter. The judgment of tendency
is usually a contingent one, being depend-
ent upon concrete circumstances which
vary from time to time, from place to
place, and even from person to person. In
this area, the human enactment cannot
execute its divine mandate by implement-
ing conclusions of higher law, for the con-
clusions of higher law in these matters are
not open to certain discovery by human
wisdom. Reason can show men only a
probability that the concrete act tends to
fulfill or frustrate a natural law principle.
Such probabilities are the bases for human
enactments which determine obligations
which the principles of natural law do not
impose conclusively upon men. Where a
person would be unjustly enriched at the
expense of another if he were permitted to
retain property to which he has title, the
natural law obliges him to, somehow, save
that other from harm. Our law determines
a precise way in which this duty shall be
performed-the title owner is subjected to
the specific obligations of a "constructive
trustee."
Out of the contingent quality of the
judgment that a specific act or line of con-
duct fulfills or frustrates principles of the
higher law, arises a prime requirement in
respect of human enactments which foster
or inhibit such conduct. This requirement
is that the enactment shall be implemented
only after mature deliberation. It is this
principle which founds our constitutional
requirements of orderly legislative process,
of freedom of speech, assembly and peti-
tion, of executive veto and judicial review.
The principle justifies also the concepts
that the law should be applied under the
supervision of trained judges, by juries
subject to challenge, and that judges
should explain their findings openly and in
terms of "artificial reason."
Second Principle: A human law is not
just if it is made without competence
Competence here has a three-fold refer-
ence. The law-making authority of a com-
munity is legitimated to the person or
persons exercising it where the commu-
nity has somehow consented to its exercise
by that person or persons. Jurisdiction is
determined, generally, by the physical
limits of the community whose legitimated
authority makes the enactment. Special
consideration must be given here to the
competency of the community and of its
law-making authority to legislate upon a
specific moral subject matter.
It seems difficult, where the enactment
simply prohibits or simply forbids, clearly
to distinguish the concept of competence
in the subject matter of an enactment from
the principles requiring that the human
enactment shall violate no higher law
(First Principle, supra), and that the
enactment shall be directed to the common
good (Third Principle, infra). Yet it seems
reasonable to suggest that since the natural
scope of the civil society's common good
is the material conditions which further the
development of the human personality, the
civil society is not competent, for example,
to enact laws which command or forbid
purely mental acts. Also, it seems correct
to say that commands and prohibitions di-
rectly violative of a higher law are not only
unjust but incompetent. The higher law has
"pre-empted" competence to regulate the
subject matter.
The distinction is clearer where the pre-
cise moral subject matter which the enact-
ment purports to affect is not a simple
command or prohibition, but rather the
extinction of an existing moral obligation.
For example, the law of the state em-
powers an infant to rescind a valid con-
tract. When the infant does so, he is dis-
charged from the moral obligation to per-
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form, which had arisen out of his act of
making the contract. Thus the law, through
the power of rescission which it gives to the
infant, extinguishes an existing moral ob-
ligation. This the civil society is competent
to do where the obligation respects prop-
erty, but the natural law makes the state
incompetent to extinguish the moral obli-
gations which arise out of a valid contract
of marriage. The common law, in the days
when it predicated itself upon the natural
law, never purported to void a marriage
which had been valid ab initio. The limit
of the civil society's power in respect of
marriage is this: for persons whose mar-
riages are not confided by divine mandate
to the competence of some other society,
the law of the civil society can, with full
moral effect, invalidate ab initio marriages
truly adverse to the common good of that
society-secret marriages, for example, be-
cause such marriages create social and
moral jeopardy for the parties and for
other persons as well.
Another example illustrates the incom-
petence of human law in the area of prop-
erty, an area which, generally, is within
human legislative competence. A law of
prescription or of adverse possession has
no moral effect to extinguish an owner's
rights or to create ownership in a possessor
where the possessor has not good faith. If
he takes or holds the thing in violation of
a duty, known subjectively to him, not to
take it or to hand it over to its owner, the
law does not extinguish his moral obliga-
tions or the owner's moral rights. The law
cannot, morally, put a premium upon con-
scious wrongdoing, whatever it may be
able to do for a man who does wrong
ignorantly.
The concept of competence in the moral
subject matter is seen most clearly where
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a divine positive law has deprived a human
society of competence in a moral area
which had belonged to it by natural law.
The Christian revelation denies to the state
any competence to enact laws respecting
the validity of marriages contracted by
baptized persons. In the supernatural
order, such marriages are given a special
character which differentiates them from
natural contracts of marriage. Thus they
are withdrawn from the civil jurisdiction
which has competence to legislate, reason-
ably, upon the validity ab initio of the
marriages of unbaptized persons.
Third Principle: A human law is not just
if it is not directed to the common good
Under natural law, the end or purpose
of civic life is to preserve, develop, and
perfect the human person, by providing
external conditions needed by the citizens
as a whole to develop their qualities and
to fulfill their duties in every sphere of life
-material, intellectual and religious. It
follows that the ends of society are no
other than the ends of human life. Con-
duct conducive to the ends of society is an
obligation of the society's members, im-
posed as such by the order of being and
the moral order, which require men to live
in society in order to have aids necessary
to perform their duties to God. The com-
mon good of society must include the in-
dividual's immunity from interference in
those goods he needs to fulfill his moral
duties, and it must include also those ex-
ternal conditions which are needed for the
full human development of the citizens as
a whole.
A law which promotes conditions need-
ful to the citizens as a whole, but which
invades even one individual's necessary
moral immunity, is an unjust law. Thus,
a tax law which is generally equitable and
furthers the economic well being of the
whole group of citizens, is unjust to the
extent that it directly makes an individual
unable to obtain by his labor the bare
necessities of life.
Laws, like that on adverse possession of
realty, which extinguish moral rights of
one individual in favor of another, serve
the general needs of society, yet they are
not just laws if they do not respect the
necessary moral immunity of the individ-
ual deprived. When owners leave their
lands long unused and unoccupied, society
is deprived of benefits which accrue to it
from the occupancy and exploitation of the
land-these are benefits which are truly
significant and even necessary to the gen-
eral welfare. No one will trouble to main-
tain or improve lands neglected by their
owners if the improver can be turned out
at any time by the neglectful owner or
even by that owner's remote successors.
Yet the law of adverse possession would
be unjust if it gave title to a possessor
who came upon the land and occupied it
without any act reasonably calculated to
give notice to the owner that his title was
in jeopardy, or if the law gave title to one
whose entry and occupation had been
licensed by the owner himself.
On the other hand, society has no true
good which is not a good in reference to
the human development of its citizens.
Therefore, a law which, though it did not
invade any individual's reserve of neces-
sary moral immunity yet did not foster
conditions needful to the whole group of
citizens, is not a just law. Thus, in a so-
ciety where the financial needs of the com-
munity could be provided for adequately
by an equitable income tax, a capital levy
would be unjust to the extent that it would
discourage thrift and enterprise.
Society may reasonably and justly for-
bid a citizen, even directly, to take alco-
holic drink, if the prohibition serves a true
need of the societal group. The need ap-
pears clearly where the prohibition is par-
ticularized, as, for example, in respect of
soldiers and policemen on duty or of
persons operating vehicles in public. But
that any such need is actually served by a
general prohibition law, which forbids the
act of drinking directly or even indirectly,
by barring liquor from commerce, does
not clearly appear.
The intelligent application of this prin-
ciple of the common good requires not
only that attention be given to its philo-
sophical implications. Careful attention to
the data of the social sciences is also re-
quired. With proper reservations made as
to their philosophical implications, the ex-
plorations of such jurisprudents as Pound
and Fuller in the matters of social interests
and the practical principles of social order
are valuable aids in assessing the justice
of a law from the viewpoint of its direction
to the common good.
Fourth Principle: A human law is not
just if it inequitably distributes benefits
and burdens among the members of the
community
The benefits and burdens which the law
distributes are measured not only in physi-
cal terms of material things taken and
given, and of physical labor required or
dispensed with. Even such material items
are viewed, by morality and by just law,
in the light of human needs, more or less
urgent and more or less closely related to
the individual's necessary immunity and
to the common good. Neither these con-
siderations of human need nor the correla-
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tive considerations of human capacity are
limited to objects mensurable in terms of
matter and energy-the needs and the
capacities of the extraordinary person, the
ordinary person, the immature person, the
person handicapped by nature or by cir-
cumstances or by the activity of those who
are more competent or more powerful,
must be assessed also in terms of mental
and moral resources. There is not true
equity where a man's goods and labor are
respected but he is burdened with un-
reasonable duties of inquiry and foresight
which shackle his freedom of action.
Finally this complex human situation is
regulated by a device which, though it may
appear subtle and overly delicate to the
layman, is known to its ministers for the
gross and crude instrument that it is. The
law itself, being the product of generaliza-
tion upon immensely diverse situations,
and being an attempt to coerce activities
whose true objectives are often beyond
coercion's reach, cannot distribute with
perfect equality even those benefits and
burdens whose measure is open to clear
and exact determination. Many of the law's
crudities are ameliorated when the juris-
prudent and the lawmaker view the law
from the standpoint of Professor Fuller's
thesis on the Principles of Order. And
while one deplores the philosophical
myopia of the analytical jurisprudents he
cannot adequately serve justice if he
ignores their scientific contributions as
means by which the law can be so shaped
as to react sensitively to the subt'e de-
mands of true equity.
Despite the complexity of the law's sub-
ject matter and the crudeness of the legal
instrument, practical reason, instructed by
moral philosophy and legal science, can
judge that the burdens and benefits of a
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given law are equitably or inequitably dis-
tributed to such degree that the law is just
or unjust, and thus effective or not in the
orders of law and of morals.
All Moral Obligations are Created
by Some Law
In the moral order, the concept of duty
or obligation is antecedent to the correla-
tive concept of right. There is in one man
a moral claim upon another's act or for-
bearance, only if the other is obliged by
the moral order so to act or so to forbear.
Because each man has duties to God
which he cannot perform without the con-
currence of others, each man has moral
rights against other men, individually and
collectively, for their necessary concur-
rence. It is because men have duties to
God which can be performed only by com-
munity living, that the community has
from God moral power to impose upon
individuals in the community coercive
moral obligations, which give rise to cor-
relative rights in the community and in its
members. The same duties to God premise
the moral power of the human community
to defend itself against outsiders who
would destroy it or unreasonably impede
its proper function.
The just human law can coerce obliga-
tions imposed categorically by natural law,
and it can impose categorically moral ob-
ligations which are not so imposed by the
law of nature. These latter obligations,
made categorical by the human law, derive
from natural law mediately-through the
general precept of natural law requiring
men to fulfill their moral duties to God.
The duties, for example, to conserve one's
life and to provide for one's family, are
imposed by that general precept, and
their performance requires men to live in
community. The duty to live in community
is not fulfilled by man's physical presence
among others. He lives in community, truly
and humanly, when his way of life is di-
rected, by charity, justice and prudence, to
the common good of the community. The
competent and equitable laws of society,
directed to the common good, are effective
to impose as categorical obligations of jus-
tice, moral obligations which the natural
law imposes only alternatively, and also
moral obligations whose only natural moral
quality is their derivation from the natural
duty to live in society and to contribute by
one's lawful conduct to the advancement
of the common good.
No individual, by his act done in ab-
sence of law, can bind himself to another
or another to himself, either legally or
morally. An individual, hitherto free of a
specific obligation or not possessed of a
specific right, can voluntarily do an act
which has such impact upon the moral
order that morality imposes upon him that
obligation, or gives him that right. A
promise could not bind its maker to its
fulfillment if his act of making the promise
did not bring his performance of the con-
duct promised under the moral precept of
fidelity. The voluntary acceptance of an-
other's offer to promise contractually
could not give the offeree a moral right to
demand performance if his act of accept-
ance did not bring the promisor under the
moral precept of commutative justice, by
giving to the promisor that act or promise
for which he bargained his promise.
The operative precept, under which one
is brought by his act or by the act of an-
other, may be one imposed conclusively
or alternatively by natural law, whether
the precept be coerced or not by human
law. It may be one imposed by just human
law which determines or specifies and
coerces an obligation that is only alterna-
tive in natural law. Or, finally, it may be
a precept imposed by a just law which
makes obligatory and coerces, for the sake
of the common good, conduct not pre-
scribed by natural law, either conclusively
or alternatively.
Moral Obligations Created and
Discharged by Human Law
Where the just human law creates a
moral obligation which would not have
come into existence in the absence of such
law, there is no difficulty in perceiving
that the entire content of the obligation
derives immediately from the human law
in question. And it is clear that the human
law can discharge its subject from the
obligations the law itself has imposed.
This sort of moral obligation is exempli-
fied by the great mass of moral duties
which arise directly out of the law's ex-
ercise of its moral power to coerce. When
a just law coerces performance of some
obligation by its subject, one can always
distinguish the subject's obligation to
suffer coercion from any duty of the sub-
ject, the performance of which is the ob-
jective of the coercive law.
Unless and until the legal machinery of
coercion is made to operate in his regard,
neither the duty whose performance is the
objective of legal coercion, nor the mere
existence of the coercive law, imposes any
obligation upon the subject to suffer the
coercion that the legal machinery is de-
signed to impose. And if the coercive law
limits its machinery's function in regard
to the subject, his obligation to suffer its
operation is thus curtailed.
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Thus, for example, the court cannot,
legally or morally, apply coercion to a per-
son who has not been made a defendant
before it. A person against whom no com-
plaint or accusation has been made-even
by a judge in a situation where a judge
may accuse on his own motion-has no
obligation to suffer any detriment pre-
scribed by a statute, or considered by the
court, as appropriate to an act this person
has done. And if the law permits a person,
made defendant by complaint or accusa-
tion, to stop the process of legal coercion
by bringing some fact to the attention of
the court, the defendant is freed of any
moral obligation to suffer coercion
premised upon the complaint or accu-
sation.
Even if the law gives the complainant an
action and gives no defense to this action,
the only moral obligation imposed by the
law upon the defendant is to suffer the co-
ercion lawfully incidental to or resulting
from the activity of a court where the
cause is pleaded and proved. He is obliged
by natural law, even though the human
law should not re-enact this obligation, to
use no unjust means to defeat the action
against him, or to diminish the recovery to
which the complainant is by just law en-
titled.
For greater reason, if the law authorizes
no coercion against a man-his conduct
gives no cause of action-he has no obliga-
tion to permit a court, moved by his moral
wrongdoing alleged in a complaint or ac-
cusation, to coerce him in the matter of
such conduct. Yet, in such case, his mor-
ally wrongful conduct may subject him to
the obligation to submit to the naturally
just coercion of his victim's reasonable
self-defense or self-help.
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Moral Obligations Specified or
Determined by Human Law and
Discharged Thereby
When a natural moral obligation is such
that it can be performed by any one of
several lines of conduct, these conduct pat-
tems may be said to be alternatively obli-
gatory. An example was given above,
namely, in distinguishing the legal order
within the moral order. A just human law
is competent to limit the choice of the sub-
ject to some, or even to one, of the
naturally adequate performances-such a
law is said to "specify" or "determine"
natural law.
When the law has done this, the subject
may discharge his original obligation by a
performance the law does not accept, but
he cannot thus discharge his full moral
duty. To fulfill the moral obligation im-
posed by the specifying or determining
human law, he must give a legal perform-
ance. Sometimes the law itself concludes
upon his choice-one cannot satisfy his
full moral obligation to contribute to com-
munity needs by making gifts to charity, or
even to the state, in lieu of paying just
taxes. In other laws, the individual who is
beneficiary of the subject's obligation has
the right to insist upon legal perform-
ance, but the subject satisfies the law if a
legally inadequate performance is accepted
by his obligee-e.g., a buyer may waive
his right of inspection.
A just law, in specifying the mode of
performing a natural obligation may ex-
clude by prohibition some mode or modes
morally adequate. A food rationing law,
for example, could quite justly punish and
even make invalid the act of paying a debt
by surrender of rationed essentials.
Finally, a human law may forbid all of
the performances to which the natural law
alternatively obliges. Such a law is, of
course, equivalent to a human law which
affects an obligation of natural law for
whose performance only one means is
available to the subject-an obligation im-
posed categorically and affirmatively by
natural law. That problem will be dis-
cussed in the section next following; the
present section will advert only to human
laws which let stand or which enforce at
least one of a set of performances morally
adequate in natural law.
Under that limitation, human law does
not conflict with higher law, for the per-
formance required is morally adequate in
natural law, and the performance human
law forbids is morally optional. Given
competence in the subject matter, direc-
tion to the common good, and equitable-
ness, there appears no reason why hu-
man laws thus limited should not justly
specify natural obilgations which are al-
ternative, even forbidding some perform-
ances naturally adequate.
Nor is there any difficulty in under-
standing that a just law may, either in gen-
eral or in a given case, decline to enforce
a moral obligation hitherto determined by
it, or cease to forbid a morally ade-
quate alternative performance hitherto
prohibited. But where a performance
morally and legally adequate has satisfied
the moral obligation, the human law can-
not "revive" the natural obligation. Here
it can create a new obligation-not spe-
cifying an obligation alternative in natural
law, for that was discharged by perform-
ance, but imposing an obligation which is
warranted by the general precept of nat-
ural law requiring men to live in commu-
nity and to seek there the common good.
Where two or more natural moral obli-
gations are closely related, one must be
careful not to argue from the law's spe-
cification of means for performing one
obligation that the other or others are ex-
tinguished. Thus, defamation by a lie in-
volves the moral obligations to make the
truth known and to repair material harm.
Payment under a judgment for damages
may fulfill the latter obligation, and leave
the former outstanding because, for ex-
ample, though the plaintiff could prove
legal malice-the absence of privilege-he
could not prove mala fides.
Moral Obligations, Imposed
Categorically by Natural Law and
Discharged by Human Law
These moral obligations include those
which have only one naturally adequate
mode of performance, and those for whose
performance only one adequate means is
available to the subject.
The former are categorical negative ob-
ligations. The individual man's obligation
not to take directly human life, unless in
necessary repulse of unjust aggression,
cannot be performed in any way but by
forbearing always to do what the precept
forbids. The law which directs the execu-
tioner, and the law which compels the
soldier sharpshooter to kill a sleeping
enemy, do not discharge those persons
from the obligations of the common pre-
cept. Those laws cover cases which are not
subject to the precept, for the precept does
not forbid society, or its lawful agent de-
puted thereunto, to take the life of one
who, though his aggression has ceased, had
attacked society by serious crime; nor does
it forbid society to kill a person who is
agent of another society which is engaged
in active unjust aggression, though the
agent is not at this moment engaged in an
aggressive act. Laws which can be shown
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to prescribe or permit conduct only phy-
sically and not morally similar to conduct
forbidden by a natural moral precept will
stand as just if they meet the test of com-
petency, the common good, and equitable-
ness. But laws which prescribe or permit
conduct forbidden by such a precept are
in conflict with higher law, and cannot be
justified by considerations of competency,
common good, or equitableness. They are
not law-they neither impose nor dis-
charge moral obligations.
A law may, if it is competent, directed
to the common good, and equitable, justly
permit to its subject conduct contrary to
an affirmative moral precept of the nat-
ural law, and may justly forbid conduct
prescribed by such a precept.
The former effect is had where the law
imposes a duty whose performance makes
impossible the subject's performance of
the natural moral duty. Such laws must be
tested carefully, with particular reference
to their equitableness and to the possibility
that they invade the subject's necessary
moral immunity. Laws which, for the sake
of technical education or military training,
would leave no practical opportunity for
religious practice over long periods, would
be unjust. Laws which, for the needs of
public security, require service excluding all
such opportunities in true emergencies,
and some such opportunities at other
times, would be just, if the needs were real
and proportionate.
A law which is competent, directed to
the common good, and equitable can justly
forbid conduct prescribed by a categorical
but affirmative natural moral duty. The
considerations of individual immunity and
equitableness are, again, most pertinent.
National security regulations can justly
forbid one to give information to another
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who, without it, will suffer great harm and
even perish, despite the natural obligation
of charity to aid another in his extreme
peril. The obligation of justice exceeds that
of charity. Just law cannot forbid an indi-
vidual citizen, upon whom the law has
placed no special duty serving the common
good, to risk his goods and his life in per-
formance of a moral duty imposed by
natural law.
Human Laws Which Invalidate
Acts Ab Initio
Where an act's object, as established by
higher law, is to produce an obligation and
a right, the human law can prevent crea-
tion of the obligation only by preventing
the act from achieving its object.
Just human law is competent, by divine
commission implied in nature and ex-
pressed in revelation, to bind morally the
wills of its subjects. Clearly, the law, even
the law of God, cannot physically make a
man will a prescribed act or physically
prevent him (while his faculties are in-
tact) from willing a forbidden act.
It is, however, the teaching of Christian
moralists that the law can reach the will
of its subjects more intimately than by
morally binding command or prohibition.
The human law, like the divine law, can
reach the will of a man at the point where
the will chooses to do an act whose moral
object, as established by moral law, is to
create rights and obligations. At that point,
the law can prevent the will from effec-
tuating the object of the act it has chosen.
Thus intervening, a just human law pre-
vents moral rights and obligations from
arising out of an act whose moral object
is to create them. Such a law is an in-
validating law in the strict sense. In com-
mon law matters, there are few such laws
-the legal incompetency to contract, even
in a lucid interval, after inquest of office
found, is an example. In the matter of ex-
ercising statutory rights, even the right to
vote, strictly invalidating laws are quite
common.
Human Laws Which Extinguish
Existing Moral Obligations
A just law can discharge an existing
moral obligation, whether or not that obli-
gation is one created by an act of the sub-
ject. Some such laws, like the law regard-
ing rescission of infants' contracts, are
described as voiding a valid act, which is
a figure of speech used to suggest that the
net or final situation is the same as the
situation would have been if the act had
been void ab initio. Whether or not the
legal effects of a given voiding law are ex-
actly the same as those of an invalidating
law in the same premises, does not con-
cern us here. Certainly the moral effects
cannot be the same in every respect.
The voiding law extinguishes moral ob-
ligations which have existed for some time
at least-the time elapsed between the act
now voided and the present application of
the law to void the act. The law cannot
change, though it can ignore, past moral
facts. If in the period elapsed, the person
obliged has fulfilled the moral duties im-
posed by the act, he has acted morally or
virtuously-or it may be that he has acted
immorally, or that another has acted mor-
ally or immorally, in respect of the moral
rights and obligations created by the act.
The moral quality of such past acts cannot
be changed. What the law can change is
the rights and obligations now existing or
which may arise in the future, and whose
existence derives or will derive from the
act in question.
If a moral obligation is of a sort that
the human law can prevent from arising,
reason suggests no cause to doubt that the




When the coercive effect of a human
law is terminated, there is often a practical
difficulty in deciding whether obligations
and rights whose performance or protec-
tion was the objective of the law are also
terminated. This difficulty cannot arise,
obviously, in reference to the withdrawal
of the human law's coercion of obligations
categorically imposed by natural law.
Where the original obligation was an alter-
native one in natural law, several results
are possible. If the sense of the specifying
or determining human law was to forbid
a natural alternative, that prohibition dis-
appears when the coercion is removed. If
the coercion is withdrawn with respect to
all of the alternatives hitherto made legally
adequate, the situation reverts to what it
was originally-all the natural alternatives
are morally adequate. If it is withdrawn in
respect of not all, those still coerced are
alone morally adequate.
Where the obligation was one imposed
purely by the human law (for the common
good, of course), the withdrawal of coer-
cion removes the obligation for the future,
unless there remains in the legal system
some other coercion of the same obliga-
tion.
In no case does the withdrawal of coer-
cion, by itself, have the effect of voiding
rights acquired under the law. Those rights
can be extinguished only by a new enact-
ment whose effect is coercible in the legal
system.
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Where the extinguishing effect of the
law as to acquired rights is explicit, as it is
in the Negotiable Instruments Law and in
the Sales Acts, there is little practical
difficulty. Where there is a binding con-
struction of the law in this sense, the dif-
ficulty is not great-we have this in the
common law of adverse possession of real
property. Where there is neither of these
indications that the law intends to ex-
tinguish rights and obligations, and not
merely to give over enforcing them, a
problem may arise in the practical situa-
tion. If the possessor of personalty, for
example, is given all the coercive aids
which the law lends to an owner, and the
owner of the same personalty is denied
any aid whatever, do we need an express
statute or a venerable line of judicial opin-
ion to conclude that the law here attributes
ownership to the possessor?
Which of These Three Effects Does
the Law Intend?
Invalidating laws work greater hardship
than voiding laws, and voiding laws im-
pose a greater burden than laws which
merely deny or limit enforcement of rights.
Therefore the moralists apply here the
rule that burdensome laws are strictly con-
strued. The law which is reasonably pa-
tient of more than one interpretation is
construed in that sense which will im-
pose the lesser burden. The rule can be
applied, of course, only when the applica-
tion of other tests has failed to make the
law's meaning clear. We should note here
the doctrine of the moralists that a law's
effect in the realm of conscience need not
be explicitly intended by the lawmaker.
It is enough that he intends (in the context
of these three types of law) to prevent
legal obligations arising from the act, or
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to extinguish legal duties and rights which
have been created by the act, or to deny a
remedy while leaving legal rights and ob-
ligations where they stood before this
denial.
A given law may intend to prevent rights
arising, or to void rights, or merely to deny
them enforcement. The language of the
law, its context, declarations of legislative
intent, the rules of interpretation and con-
struction, and the opinions of competent
and conscientious men, well informed in
the subject matter, are means of learning
the law's intent.
A Challenge and a Caveat
It seems scarcely necessary to point ex-
plicitly to the challenge which natural law
jurisprudence issues. It challenges the men
of law to find its roots in infinite truth, to
follow where truth leads, and to stand with
truth against brute force, and against an in-
tellectuality so refined that it can see no
truth or at least no certain truth.
The caveat needs to be stated more ex-
plicitly. The task of assessing the justice of
human law, as that of judging any moral
matter in the concrete, involves serious
danger of moral or intellectual arrogance.
In most of these tasks, we are dealing with
matters which we cannot know, through
unaided human reason, with metaphysical,
mathematical, or physical certainty. We
have to rely heavily upon practical or
moral certainty, and this reliance involves
resort to devices more or less artificial. We
regard some generalities, of fact or of prin-
ciple, as being "in possession," because
they are the carefully gathered and inter-
preted data of common and prolonged
human experience. Conclusions contrary
to those generalities, though they have been
reached by careful inquiry and though
they are so clear as to enjoy some proba-
bility, may have to be set aside while the
moral judgment follows the generality
which is "in possession." This must be
done until the contrary conclusion has been
demonstrated to have the "weight of prob-
ability," or even to be probable beyond
reasonable doubt, depending upon the
moral interests secured by maintaining the
generality in possession.
Thus, for example, any law already en-
acted, when its character as a just law is to
be tested by one or several of the principles
we have described, enjoys the favor of a
generality in possession. Human laws do
not, generally, violate higher law. Human
lawmakers are, generally, legitimate, and
generally, do not act without jurisdiction
or competence. Human laws, generally, are
directed to the common good, and they
are, generally, equitable.
